Welcome back. We are continuing on with our discussion on epistemology and the question of human knowledge. We are going to begin — there'll be three lectures on Descartes' views on the subject. We're using Descartes in perhaps a non-traditional way. I think I mentioned last time that Descartes is actually — certainly earlier than Locke and so if we were doing this in a strictly historical order, we would read Descartes first and then Locke. But because Locke presents what I've called a naive empiricist view — that is, because Locke thinks that all substantive knowledge begins in sensory experience, begins the moment we open our eyes, ears, smell things, taste things, touch things — because he holds that view, there's a certain logic in presenting Descartes after Locke because Descartes gives us good reason to question a view like Locke's. Descartes gives us good reason to question any naive empiricist account of human knowledge. And so this is the reason why I'm doing Descartes after Locke, even though Descartes comes earlier than Locke in the history of ideas.

I think that there's sort of a nice point/counterpoint that we can set up here. After Descartes we're gonna present — look at some views that depart from both the Lockean and the Cartesian way of thinking. In other words, within a certain orbit, Descartes and Locke are opponents. But taken from a larger orbit, they belong to a certain kind of view about human knowledge that yet another group of philosophers — David Hume and Thomas Reid specifically — are going to criticize. And so all of that lies ahead of us. Now what we want to do is we want to look at Descartes' critique of what I've been calling naive empiricism.

The chief question in Descartes' meditations on philosophy is the question that we are concerned with in this part of the course and that is what are the foundations of human knowledge, where does human knowledge begin, what is its source. This question leads Descartes to question every one of his beliefs and their methods of justification. And the reason why the book is called Meditations is because indeed this
is exactly the process that Descartes is engaged in. He’s engaged in meditation upon
his own beliefs and his procedures of knowledge acquisition in order to ascertain where
human knowledge begins and what constitutes sound methods of knowledge
acquisition.

Descartes, like Locke, as we know, is a creature of this period we’ve called the
age of reason and enlightenment, this amazingly fertile intellectual period spanning the
17th and 18th century. Because he comes from a similar — he comes from the same
intellectual environment as Locke, many of his motivations are similar to Locke’s. I will
just mention two of Descartes’ motivations for his project here because they’re the two
that will concern us directly.

Certainly one reason why Descartes wants to identify the foundations of human
knowledge and the proper methods of inquiry is because of this general enlightenment
idea of intellectual autonomy. Descartes believes that the individual human intellect is
capable of acquiring knowledge on its own and this view he shares with Locke and with
many of his contemporaries. And so if what we are interested in is vindicating the view
that the individual human mind can acquire knowledge on its own, then our chief
interest is going to be in how it does that and what are the best procedures for it to do
that.

Another related motivation has to do with the scientific revolution’s conception of
rationality and a critique of the concept of intellectual authority. If we had more time in
this course to explore Descartes’ philosophy more fully, we would certainly read his
book, Discourse on Method, in which Descartes adopts a certain attitude concerning
human rationale. What constitutes a rationale human being. This is important
because philosophers throughout the history of philosophy have thought that part of
what distinguishes or even all that distinguishes a human being from an animal is our
capacity to reason is our rationality. And if you think about the shift from the
pre-enlightenment, the pre-modern sort of forms of civilization in which people lived and thought under external authorities — whether that of the church or the monarch, or whatever other external power they were subjected to — the idea of the scientific revolution and the enlightenment idea of rationality in a sense stands in opposition to that previous way of thinking.

It’s one thing to say, “Well, I know the things I know because some authority has told them to me.” It’s quite another to say, “I know the things I know because I have gone out in the world and investigated and examined myself, and I have employed the kinds of methods that are likely to result in true beliefs.”

And in a sense, the previous way of thinking about this — all right. The pre-modern way of thinking about this goes against the idea of rationality, right? If you believe something or if you know something on the basis of what someone else told you or what some authority has told you, that does not necessarily suggest that you are a rational or reasonable being. So the idea of intellectual autonomy and the idea of rationality sort of go together. Only the intellectually autonomous person is justifiably called rational because only the intellectually autonomous person has acquired their beliefs in a rational way.

You know, one of the classic fallacies that logic speaks about is the fallacy of arguments from authority. The fallacy goes something like this. The mere fact that someone in authority told you that P was true does not mean that P is true. In other words, truth is a matter of whether a certain proposition corresponds to the facts. The fact that someone important or someone in a position of power has told you something makes it no more likely that the proposition they’ve uttered corresponds to the facts than if someone else had told you.

And so there is a kind of a relationship between the idea of intellectual autonomy, on the one hand, and rationality on the other and Descartes is motivated by both of
these ideas. He wants to vindicate the idea that human beings — that the individual is autonomous and free intellectually in his or her capacity to acquire knowledge and also wants to vindicate the idea that human beings are essentially rational, reasonable creatures which in part relies upon our being intellectually autonomous. So both of these are motivations of Descartes in entering and engaging in this enterprise of searching for the foundations of human knowledge and identifying the best methods of knowledge acquisition.

Now, let’s return to empiricism again because it is precisely the kind of naive empiricism that we saw in Locke that Descartes is going to express doubts about right at the beginning of the meditations. Remember that according to naive empiricism, all substantive knowledge begins with sensory experience. So on this view, on the empiricist view, the foundations of knowledge consist of what Locke calls ideas of sensation. Ideas of sensation are the direct products of our perceptual engagement with the world, and Locke says this is where all human knowledge begins. There’s no knowledges out of experience and there can be no ideas of reflection, no knowledge that arises from reflection, unless there have first been ideas of sensation, knowledge acquired by way of perception. Because it’s knowledge acquired by way of perception, it provides the material, the mental contents, the thoughts upon which reflection can then operate in order to produce ideas of reflection.

So according to naive empiricism all knowledge begins with sensory experience. To employ the lingo we’ve been talking — we’ve been using with Descartes, for the naive empiricist the foundations of all human knowledge consist of ideas of sensation, ideas that come from sensory experience.

So let’s take an example and it’ll be an example that we’ll work with over the course of this lecture. Let’s take a very simple piece of knowledge. Something that I believe and that is likely to be true and justified, and that is I believe that there is a
podium in front of me. On the Lockean view the belief that there’s a podium in front of me is going to be grounded in or based on the belief that I see and feel a podium in front of me. I touch this and I look at it, and I have an idea of sensation, a mental picture of a podium. This mental picture, this sensory experience, is the basis upon which I then conclude that there is a podium in front of me.

One of the things that Descartes does in Meditation One is cast doubt on whether the second proposition is a sufficient basis upon which to infer the first. That is, what he wants to call into question is whether the fact that I see and touch a podium is sufficient reason for believing that there is a podium. Now, you might think, “Well, of course it is. What else would be a reason for thinking that there’s a podium in front of you?” I might not disagree with that conclusion but the road by which we get to that conclusion may not be the road that you think it is, or maybe a road more complicated than you might expect.

So let’s dive into the first meditation and see where Descartes thinks the problem in this inference from two to one lies. Descartes makes two observations right at the beginning of the first meditation. The first observation he makes is that our senses don’t always represent things as they actually are. Now, we sort of knew this already from our discussions of John Locke, right? Remember that our ideas only partly resemble things in the external world, according to Locke. That is, our ideas consist of both primary and secondary qualities. But, of course, the objects of the external world, according to Locke, consist only of primary qualities.

And so there already is, on the kind of view of perception that we’re working with here — and recall that Descartes’ view of perception, the mechanics of perception, is going to be essentially the same as Locke’s. All right. The view of perception that we’re working for here — which is sometimes called the double object view because, in a sense, there’s two objects of awareness. There’s the immediate object of awareness
which is a mental content, a mental picture, and then there’s the secondary object of awareness which is the object in the external world. Locke tells us, well, the object in the external world and the object of direct awareness have different characteristics.

So to employ some terminology that we’ll return to, Locke’s basic picture of perception already sets up a basic appearance reality gap. So taking the mental picture in our minds of the podium as an appearance, there is a gap between the appearance and the reality. The properties or characteristics of my idea of sensation, this mental picture of a podium, and the actual object as it exists independently of my experience of it. But Descartes wants to go further. When he talks about the senses being unreliable, the senses often misrepresenting things, he’s not only speaking about this standard sort of structural sense in which our senses always produce a mental picture that has more in it than the actual object in the external world. Descartes is talking about actual perceptual errors where our senses distort or actively misrepresent their object.

A few very simple examples will suffice. These are all examples of optical illusions. If you take a perfectly straight pencil and immerse it halfway in a glass half full of water, the pencil will look bent. So you will have an idea of sensation. You will have a mental picture of a bent pencil. But, of course, the pencil isn’t actually bent. It’s an optical illusion. And so here’s an example where one’s senses misrepresent an object, misrepresent an external object.

Another example — and this one is common, should be common to everyone. Things look smaller from a distance. If you stand at the top of a very tall building and look down, the people below look smaller than they really are. Indeed, I don’t recall if I’ve made this observation before — I think I may have at the beginning of the course — that the fact that our senses are so unreliable is so well established that we often post warnings to remind us of this fact in fear that we might forget it. If you look in the
right-side mirror of every car, you’ll see printed on the mirror — it warns you that objects are closer than they appear. Because, of course, the right-side mirror has a distorting effect that allows you to see more of what’s behind you at the price of distorting the distance of what’s behind you and to the right side of you. This sort of error, this mistake, is so pervasive and so common that car manufacturers — and obviously insurers — are concerned people are gonna forget and are gonna get into accidents. So we actually print out warning labels warning us about the potential of our senses to mislead us.

And Descartes’ point here is very simple. If our senses persistently and systematically present a false picture of the world, then how can a mere sensory experience be a sufficient basis upon which to make a concrete judgment about the nature of the world? If my senses can misrepresent this podium, misrepresent what’s in front of me, then how can the mere fact that I see and feel the podium be a sufficient basis on which to believe that there is a podium or to believe for a belief that the podium is the way that it appears? That’s the challenge that Descartes is raising.

And he says it in almost a throw-away kind of way on page 12 of your readings. He says, “Whatever I have up until now accepted as most true I’ve acquired either from the senses or through the senses, but from time to time I have found that the senses deceive. It is prudent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even once.”

So one of the points that Descartes makes against the kind of naive empiricism that we find in Locke is that the senses aren’t all that reliable. And the mental picture of the world that they provide is not a very accurate picture. And this raises questions, then, about whether indeed beliefs that arise from sensory experience can provide the kind of foundations for human knowledge that Descartes is looking for. What he’s looking for are foundations for our knowledge that will vindicate the view of us as being
intellectually autonomous and rational. Now, if the basis of our beliefs is nothing but sense perception and we know that sense perception can radically misrepresent the way the world is, then it’s difficult to see how the idea of at least human rationality is going to be vindicated.

But this error argument — and that’s what I’m gonna call it; I’m gonna call it Descartes’ argument from error — is only the tip of the iceberg. There is a much more devastating form of doubt, a more devastating form of skepticism that comes next. Descartes points out that all of us spend a good portion of our lives in the state of unconsciousness in sleep. He also points out that in sleeping we dream. He furthermore points out that our experiences while dreaming can be indistinguishable from our experiences while awake.

Now, certainly dreams are often — the content of our dreams are often bizarre. Certainly it is oftentimes the case that our dreaming experiences are radically different from our waking experiences, but that is not always the case. I can certainly say that I’ve dreamt in the past of perfectly ordinary and mundane things. I’ve dreamt myself going to work or driving the car down the highway, or any number of ordinary activities where while I’m in the dream I have no suspicion that it’s not real.

Well, the problem then is this. If I can have an experience while dreaming that is indistinguishable from an experience that arises from real sensation — all right. So, for example, I can dream that I’m standing here giving a speech and lecture in front of a podium. So if I can have a dream experience of a podium that is indistinguishable from a perception — an actual perceptual experience of the podium, then we have a problem. How can the experience alone be sufficient reason to infer that there is a podium, given that the experience may not be real? We said that naive empiricist view is the belief that there is a table is justified by the belief that I see and feel a table in front of me. Well, how can the fact that I see and feel a table in front of me — a
podium in front of me be of sufficient grounds in which to infer that there is actually a podium if I might be dreaming these exact experiences?

Descartes says this on page 13. He says, “How often asleep at night am I convinced of just such familiar events: that I am here in my dressing gown, sitting by the fire, when in fact I am lying undressed in bed?” Then he goes further on and says, “Well, wait a minute. At the moment my eyes are certainly wide awake. When I look at this piece of paper I shake my head and it’s not asleep. I stretch out and feel my hand and I do so deliberately and I know what I’m doing. All this would not happen with such distinctness to someone asleep.” But then he says, “As if I did not remember other occasions when I had been tricked by exactly similar thoughts while asleep.” In other words, he’s point out that surely all of us have had instances where we were sure that an experience was real, only to find out later that we were dreaming it. “As I think about this more clearly,” he goes on to say, “I see plainly that there never are any sure signs by means of which being awake can be distinguished from being asleep. The result is that I begin to feel dazed and this very feeling only reinforces the notion that I may be asleep.”

So if the proposal is supposed to be — if the naive empiricist proposal is, “Look, the foundations of all human knowledge is sensory experience. We have a sensory experience and that sensory experience is the basis upon which we make a judgment about something in the external world.” Descartes’ point is that cannot be a sufficient basis. Because any actual perceptual experience could be — could also be a dreamt experience. And in case of a dreamt experience, there would be no justification to draw any conclusions about the external world at all. If I am dreaming a podium, then the experience is no basis whatsoever for inferring that there is a podium. And because I can’t tell the difference between dreaming the podium and looking at the podium for real, the idea that looking at the podium is a basis upon which to determine
that there is a podium is rendered problematic.

Last time I asked you to engage in a little exercise to see if you could prove to yourself that you’re not sleeping, you’re not currently sleeping, and I hope that the point here is made. Any evidence that you might bring to bear that you’re not dreaming could itself be part of the dream. And the point is not the silly one. Descartes is not making the silly point that you should walk around acting like you’re dreaming or walk around denying that you’re really walking around or that you’re really standing in front of a podium. His point is a much more subtle one. It’s simply to say, look. What we’re talking about is what the basis of a certain — what our basis for believing things is.

And all that he’s saying is this isn’t a very good basis. It’s a basis that’s riddled with potential error. It’s a basis that, in a sense, could be entirely illusory. He’s speaking about what are the foundations of knowledge. He’s not saying anything about what you ought to believe in your ordinary life, walking around. That’s not what he’s talking about. To that extent this is — in that sense, this is an academic exercise.

I would submit, however, that it is an important one. Because in this question of where does our knowledge come from, what are the grounds upon which we know things, all sorts of things are invested including our own standing as rational, intellectually autonomous beings. And so while the question is — the things that he’s asking and the doubts he’s raising are largely academic things, largely academic things and doubts, I would suggest that they have great import even for our own ordinary lives.

So let’s go back to our examples. So proposition one, statement one, is I believe that there is a table in front of me, that there’s a podium in front of me. Statement two is I see and feel a podium in front of me. According to the naive empiricist, the second statement provides a justification for the first. The second statement is the foundation upon which the first statement is based. But now with the argument from error, the argument from dreaming in place, the following question
arises. Okay. Two is supposed to justify one. But what is the justification for two? If I’m experiencing a perceptual illusion or if I’m dreaming, then my experience is not a sufficient basis on which to infer that there’s a podium.

So the question is how do I know that my eyes aren’t playing tricks on me? How do I know that I’m not dreaming? In truth, one only follows from two. If we also have available an additional premise — let’s call it three — and what three says is I am neither dreaming nor experiencing a perceptual illusion, then one follows from two. So here’s the amended proof, let’s call it, or the amended line of justification. Statement one, I believe that there’s a table in front of me is supposedly grounded in statement two, I see and feel a table in front of me. It only is grounded in two if I also can show that I am not dreaming or experiencing a perceptual illusion, statement three.

But of course statement three is itself a knowledge claim. What justifies it? If my current experience of the podium, if my current idea of sensation is to provide grounds upon which to infer that there is a podium, I have to first know that I am neither dreaming nor experiencing a perceptual illusion, and the question is what is the basis upon which I could know that?

Now, notice what obviously could not be the basis. It could not be another perceptual experience, right? I couldn’t say, “Well, the way that I know that I’m not dreaming or experiencing an illusion, the way I know that is by reference to some other experience I’m having.” Because, of course, the same doubts are gonna apply to that. If the question at hand is how do we know that our perceptions are valid or acute, how do we know that we’re actually having a perception rather than dreaming it, then obviously I can’t answer the question by appealing to another perception because it’s the validity or accuracy of perception that is itself at question.

So what I want to say at this point is that Descartes has shown — he’s demonstrated that ideas of sensation cannot provide the ultimate grounds of human
knowledge. The only way that any perceptual experience can provide the basis for any piece of human knowledge about the world is if we can first assume that our perceptions are accurate, that we’re actually seeing something, and that what we’re seeing is the way that that something actually is. But that belief cannot be based itself on a perception and so perception cannot constitute the beginning of knowledge. This is a direct refutation of Locke’s idea that all knowledge begins in sensory experience.

But Descartes considers another possibility. The empiricist, of course, says that all substantive knowledge begins in sensory experience but the empiricist also may grant that some non-substantive knowledge may be known a priori, may be known independently of experience. One form of a priori knowledge or one way of a priori knowing, of course, is deductive reasoning. When we prove something deductively, the product of that proof is non-empirical knowledge. Because in a deductive proof, the conclusions follow from the premises solely in virtue of their form. That’s what validity is. When we say an argument is valid, we’re saying it’s of the form in which the premises follow from the conclusions — where the conclusions follow from the premises. Excuse me.

So Descartes then wants to entertain the possibility and say, look. Maybe the foundations of human knowledge are not empirical. Maybe the foundations of human knowledge don’t come from sensory experience. Maybe the foundations of human knowledge instead lie in deductive reasoning. Maybe human knowledge is a lot like geometry where we begin with a set of axioms and all the foundations of the superstructure of knowledge are deductively proven. Think about the body of geometric knowledge as our knowledge as a whole. Imagine that that was all we knew. The foundations of our knowledge in geometry are deductive proofs. Deductive proofs from a set of axioms. And Descartes is wondering, “Well, maybe human knowledge is like that. Maybe geometry is, in a sense, the model of human knowledge.”
And so let’s take another two examples. We’ll call these 1A, 2A and 3A. Let’s just take one piece of deductive knowledge and it’ll be from geometry since it’s the most — it’s the easiest, cleanest example of deductive knowledge that I can think of. So here’s the thing that I claim to know: 1A, the square of a hypotenuse of a triangle is equal to the sum of the square of its legs. A squared plus B squared equals C squared. My basis for believing this, the justification for this, is going to be some geometry proof. I’m embarrassed to tell you that I don’t think I can prove this. I could do it in tenth grade when I took geometry and it’s been a long time since then. So excuse me for just having 2A say some geometry proof. So 1A is the square of the hypotenuse of a triangle is equal to the sum of the square of its legs and 2A, the statement — the belief that justifies it, is the belief in some geometry proof.

Descartes wants to say that deductive proofs, because they’re not grounded in perceptual experience, cannot be doubted on the grounds either of perceptual error or an argument from dreaming. At one point in Meditation One he says — and I’m not gonna dig out the page number. It’s just one little sentence. He says, “Whether I’m asleep or awake, 2 plus 3 makes 5.” And so a priori knowledge of this kind, knowledge that’s grounded in deductive proofs rather than perceptual evidence, is not going to be subject to the kinds of doubts that he raised thus far.

But, of course, there are other doubts that Descartes wants to explore. There is a version of the error argument that we can run against the deductive proof. But surely when you’ve done proofs, either in geometry or in arithmetic or in set theory or whatever, you’ve made mistakes. Surely our practices of proving things are not flawless. And so at any given time when I’ve given a proof for something, there’s always the possibility that I’ve done the operations incorrectly, that I’ve done the proofs incorrectly.

Descartes raises an even more troubling possibility and again it is a possibility.
He’s not claiming that this is the case. Descartes says — well, first he talks about God. He says, “Well, couldn’t God manipulate my mind in such a way as to get me to think that 1A is true when it’s really false?” Put the question another way: “Couldn’t God convince me — get me to think that 2 plus 3 equals 7 instead of 5? Isn’t he powerful enough to do that?”

Then, of course — and you can tell it’s a sign of the times — Descartes doesn’t come long after Galileo who ran into troubles with the medieval church for his unorthodox views on the nature of the universe. Descartes then realizes that he may be getting close to blasphemy so he quickly switches his example and says, “Well, never mind about God.” Page 15, he says, “I will suppose therefore that not God, who is supremely good in the sense of truth, but rather some malicious demon of the utmost power and cunning has employed all his energies in order to deceive me.”

So couldn’t a demon or the devil, let’s say, if there is such a creature, manipulate our minds in such a way as to convince us that certain deductively proven things are true when they’re really false? And so the possibility — the reason why — this has a little bit of the same relation to the error argument, the deductive error argument that the dreaming argument has to the perceptual error argument. It’s simply a more total, more global, more catastrophic version of the same doubt. In the case of the error argument, we simply are reflecting upon our ordinary real mistakes which occur from time to time. But Descartes is saying something like this: “Look. If there’s the possibility that we make mistakes from time to time, does that not also mean that there’s the possibility that we are mistaken all of the time?” The evil demon is simply a device to make this point.

And what this shows is that 2A only provides a valid basis on which to believe 1A if we can believe one further thing, call it 3A. So let’s run through them again. The statement that the square of the hypotenuse of a triangle is equal to the sum of the
squares of its legs is only justified by a geometry proof if I can also justify the belief that I’ve done the proof correctly and I’m not being manipulated by a malicious third party. But the question now is what justifies 3A? How do I know that I’m doing the proof correctly and that I’m not being manipulated by a malicious third party? Obviously, my justification can’t be an appeal to some proof. Because here it’s the validity of proofs that is under question. So I can’t use a proof to prove a proof, to prove the validity of a proof. But, of course, I also can appeal to perception in order to justify this belief, to justify 3A, because perception has also been called into question on the grounds we articulated earlier and has not been solved. And so apparently Descartes has also shown that deductive proofs cannot provide the grounds for human knowledge.

Many of you are probably thinking, well, what’s left? If it’s not perception, if it’s not sensory experience that provides the beginnings of our knowledge and if it’s not deductive reasoning that constitutes the beginnings of human knowledge, then what is left? And indeed, Descartes himself wonders this. It’s why Meditation Two begins on such a note of despair. If you look at page 16, the beginning of Meditation Two, look at that first passage. He says, quote, “So serious are the doubts into which I’ve been thrown as a result of yesterday’s meditation that I can neither put them out of my mind nor see any way of resolving them. It feels as if I have fallen unexpectedly into a deep whirlpool which tumbles me around so that I can neither stand on the bottom or swim up to the top.”

Descartes is not seeing the way out of this problem and remember why this matters for him. For Descartes, the very notion, the very idea that we are intellectually autonomous, rational beings is at stake. If we cannot show that human knowledge has rational origins, that we have good reason for thinking the things that we think, believing the things that we believe about the external world and about mathematical and other forms of objective truth — if we can’t show that there is a rational basis for this
knowledge, for these beliefs, then the idea that we are rational is hard to credit.

And the specter of some form of intellectual authority then arises again. Because if you are not capable of acquiring knowledge on your own in a rational fashion, then obviously you need help. You need to have your knowledge handed to you from an authority. Whether it be God, whether it be clergy, whoever. And so there’s an awful lot at stake here for Descartes. Indeed for Descartes, what he sees as that risk is the entire enlightenment because the entire enlightenment is predicated on the assumption of human intellectual autonomy and rationality.

And so the very premise on which the enlightenment is based, the very premise on which the enlightenment philosophers want to object to, political oppression in the form of monarchy, the very basis on which the enlightenment philosophers want to assert the prerogative of scientific investigation over church dogmatic natural science is threatened if we cannot identify the foundations of human knowledge and show that those foundations are rational.

So Descartes is in a pickle. And it’s a testament to how brilliant a man he is that he gets out of the pickle very quickly. Ultimately, at the end of the day, as you probably have figured out, I don’t think Descartes’ project is going to succeed. But he gets out of the current conundrum very quickly.

So let’s talk for a minute about next time. We’re going to start Meditation Two next time and we’re going to address Descartes’ attempt to solve the puzzles that we’ve seen arise in Meditation One, what are the foundations of human knowledge. Given that we can’t base human knowledge and perceptual experience alone, given that we can’t base human knowledge and deductive reasoning alone, what do we base human knowledge in?

And here are two things to think about while you’re reading. The first is that Descartes is going to say in Meditation Two that we cannot doubt the belief “I exist.” In
other words, the statement “I exist,” he says, cannot be doubted. What I want you to do is explain his reasoning and why does he think this.

The second question I want to ask you is gonna sound strange, but it won’t once you read the chapter. Given what we’re talking about, what is the relevant difference between the following statements. Quote, “I see a table,” unquote and, quote, “I seem to see a table,” unquote. What is the relevant difference between those two statements given what we have been talking about here today.

Those are the two things I want you to think about when you read Meditation Two and we will pick up where we left off next time. Thank you very much.