Welcome back. Today we will begin our lecture on Aristotle’s ethics. If you recall in our introductory remarks on ethics, when I talked about virtue ethics, I said that the central question of virtue ethics, and apropos our discussions today, the central focus of Aristotle’s ethics which is the classic example of a virtue ethic, is what is the human good. And what virtue ethicists mean by this or what this question translates into is the question, what constitutes human fulfillment or excellence? Or alternatively, what is the praiseworthy human life?

Now, Aristotle gives more than one answer. That is, Aristotle thinks that there’s more than one way to live excellently as a human being. And his answers will draw upon a broad — a broad tapestry of elements including an analysis of human nature, moral and civic virtue, the nature of contemplation, and the relationships of human beings to God. So Aristotle’s conception of the good life, of the human good, is going to draw on all the resources of his broader philosophy and his view, his outlook, on human nature.

Aristotle — his dates are 384 to 322 B.C. He’s one of the two most important philosophers of antiquity and many would argue of all time. The other, of course, is Plato who was Aristotle’s teacher. Aristotle was Plato’s greatest student at the academy. Aristotle, in turn, was the tutor of Alexander the Great, of course the great emperor who conquered at that time — I believe carved out the largest empire that the world had seen up until that date.

Aristotle also founded his own school later in his career. He founded a school called the Lyceum. It was also called the Peripatetic School named after the Peripatos,
which was a cloister-like walkway, and Aristotle’s followers were often called
Peripatetics because they were famous for walking around the Peripatos, deep in
discussion, deep in thought and discussion. The Lyceum quickly became the chief
rival to Plato’s academy and so Aristotle is important for having founded one of the two
greatest philosophical schools of the ancient world.

Aristotle wrote works in physics, cosmology, zoology, biology, logic, metaphysics,
philosophy of mind, ethics, politics and more. We don’t have any of his actual writings.
They were destroyed — of course, in the ancient world there was no mass duplication
of texts, so all that existed were handwritten copies. We have none of the surviving —
none of the works, actual works, of Aristotle written by his hand. What we have — the
books that we have that go under the name Aristotle are really collections of lecture
notes taken from his courses. There’s a whole industry of Aristotle scholarship, trying
to figure out what exactly Aristotle’s views were given the fact that the texts that we
have were put together by subsequent editors.

Aristotle’s influence is enormous. His physics and his cosmology became the
official science of the Roman Catholic Church throughout the Middle Ages. And so
Aristotle’s picture — basic picture of the universe was church dogma until the
Renaissance. His philosophy more generally carried almost supreme authority. He is
sort of the official Catholic philosopher, which is sort of interesting considering that
Aristotle himself, of course, was a pagan being an ancient Greek, particularly a
Macedonian. And it’s sort of a testimony to sort of the universal appeal that his views
held, that his views would become — would sit at the center of Christian dogma for
nearly a millennium. Actually probably a little more than a millennium. Aristotle was so central that indeed the medieval philosophers referred to him simply as “the philosopher,” as if he was the only one.

So this is one of those people you just simply can’t avoid in philosophy. You can’t take a philosophy course without learning about Aristotle. I won’t hide the fact that his ethics is one of my favorite works and, indeed, probably one of the ethical treatises that I agree with the most, so you’ll find me probably uncommonly enthusiastic in presenting this material.

In our introductory remarks, when I first sort of introduced the subject of ethics, when we talked about virtue ethics I talked about the functional notion — the functional conception of good. So the word *good* has many uses, but one of the uses that we employ it for is to denote excellence in a function. So when we talk about a good car, a good computer, a good runner, a good baseball pitcher, we’re using the word *good* to — in a functional sense. In ancient Greece the word was *telos*. The word *telos* in Greek means function or purpose. And to sort of use the Greek lingo, what we’re talking about in virtue ethics are teleological notions of the good, notions of the good that employ the term in its functional sense.

And let’s be a little more specific now by what we mean by a functional conception of the good or a teleological conception of the good. A thing’s distinctive purpose or function is its telos. So every object has a distinctive function. So the function of this pen, for example, is to write, of course. There are any number of things I could use the pen for other than writing. I can use it, let’s say, to prop open the
A window in my house, but that’s not its distinctive function. That’s sort of an accidental use to which it could be put. Now, of course, as you would probably expect in philosophy, there is an enormous amount of difficulty in laying out a principle by which one can distinguish essential from accidental functions. Aristotle has one way of going about this and, needless to say, it’s been subject to the kind of criticism that you would expect a philosophy this old and this important to attract.

But suffice it to say for now that things and activities and processes for Aristotle have distinctive functions. The fulfillment of these functions or purposes constitute the thing’s good. To speak again in this sort of ancient Greek way of speaking, the good of this pen is to write well. Writing well is the fulfilment of its function. The fulfillment of its function is it’s good. What makes the pen a good pen, then, in the functional sense of good is that it writes well.

Aristotle gives a number of examples here and I’ll just read to you a few of the examples that Aristotle presents. Right on the first page, on page 3 of the *nicomachean ethics* in your readings, he says, “There are many actions, skills and sciences and it happens that there are many ends as well. The end of medicine is health, that of shipbuilding a ship, that of military science, victory, and that of domestic economy, wealth.” I’m sure you notice here that he uses the word *end* rather than *good*. These are all synonyms. Something’s end is its good. The end for which it exists or the end for which it is made. The fulfillment of that end is its good.

So the reason why you engage in, as one of the examples he gives is medical science, the purpose of engaging in medical science is to produce healthy people. So
producing healthy people or curing sickness or increasing lifespan, those all constitute 
goods — the goods of medicine. All right. The purpose or ends of military strategy is 
victory, is to win wars. And so victory constitutes the end, the good, of military strategy. 
A good military strategy is one that results in victory. Thus, victory constitutes the end 
or the good of military strategy, and so on and so forth.

An example that’s sort of very obvious in this case, as an example of a thing 
rather than an activity, is a hammer. The distinctive purpose or function of a hammer is 
to pound nails or drive nails. I’m suddenly wondering what the right verb is. The 
purpose of the hammer is to drive nails, let’s say, and so a good hammer is one that 
drives nails well. And so driving nails well constitutes the end or the good of a 
hammer.

Oh, and just one more piece of — way of speaking. Because when we read 
Aristotle, it’s important — you know, we’re dealing with an author from thousands of 
years ago and so there’s ways of speaking that we need to acclimate ourselves to. 
Aristotle is going to speak of a thing aiming at its end or a process, aiming at its end. 
So pounding nails well is the end at which hammers aim. Now, I know we don’t 
normally speak about inanimate objects as aiming at anything. But, as we’ll see in a 
moment, Aristotle conceives of the whole universe as being imbued with purpose, with 
direction. Purpose is always directed. A purpose in aim or a purpose that is directed 
towards its end. And so in a quite literal sense, the hammer aims at its end which is 
pounding nails well. Medical science aims at its end which is health. Military science 
aims at its end which is victory.
Now, the prevailing view today is that only manmade things have genuine functions or purposes. That is, the only genuine functions and purposes that we acknowledge today are those that are the result of intention. So we accept that a hammer has a genuine purpose or an end, and the reason is because it is a thing that is made on purpose. A hammer is a manmade artifact that’s made with a certain intention in mind, and it’s this intent as well as the hammer’s design that makes the hammer’s purpose what it is.

We don’t today tend to speak of purposes or functions in nature. Or at least we don’t believe that there are genuine purposes or functions in nature, although there is the appearance of purpose or function in nature. And, of course, the reason that we no longer think of there being purposes or functions in nature is because of the revolution in biology that occurred in the 19th century. The Darwinian revolution, the theory of evolution by natural selection. And what was so ingenious about the theory of evolution by natural selection is that it explained the appearance of purpose or intent, even though there is actually none.

So, of course, just sort of the briefest possible version of this, you have in any species of animals or plants random genetic mutations. Some of those genetic mutations will be conducive to the life of the animal or plant, given the environmental circumstances. Others will be detrimental. Those animals or plants with the detrimental genes will die and will not pass them on. Eventually those genes will have vanished from the gene pool. Those animals and plants with the positive — with the beneficial genetic mutations will thrive and will reproduce, and those genes will become
a permanent fixture in the gene pool or at least temporarily permanent in geological time.

Now, this is true even for parts of nature that seem obviously designed. If you think about hearts or lungs or kidneys, these seem to have obvious functions. Obviously the function of the heart is to pump blood. Obviously the function of the kidneys is to filter — is to filter the blood, I think. You can tell I haven’t taken biology in a while. I know the function of the liver is to clean the body. The point is, there seem to be purposes and functions in nature — for example, in the case of internal organs -- just as there are purposes or functions in the case of manmade objects. However, on the modern way of thinking, the way that we think today in science, those purposes and functions are, in a sense, accidental. They’re not the result of intention. They’re simply the result of an accidental fit between environment on the one hand and a set of random genetic mutations on the other. Because it’s beneficial to have an organ that cleans your blood, the creatures with the genes that create that organ survive and the creatures with the genes that didn’t die. That’s the sort of quick version of this.

So today the prevailing view is that only manmade things have genuine functions or purposes. That is, today we only typically apply teological language to manmade things, things that are made on purpose. The reason I’m belaboring this so long is because in the ancient world there was a very, very different conception. Aristotle believed that every thing, process and activity, both natural and artificial, has a function or purpose. The entire universe, in Aristotle’s view, is a purposeful zone of existence, if you want to call it that.
All right. Purpose or telos is a central explanatory concept in ancient science, in ancient Greek science. Purpose is not an explanatory concept in modern science and that has been true since the scientific revolution. So you have the mechanical revolution in physics in the 17th and 18 centuries, you have the revolution in biology in the 19th century. Both of these revolutions abandoned purpose or telos as a central explanatory concept, preferring to explain in purely mechanical terms in terms of brute mechanical processes. But for Aristotle, the entire universe is imbued with purpose. Every thing and process and activity has a place within that gigantic universal purpose so everything has its own distinctive purpose, its own distinctive essence, its own distinctive place, its own distinctive function in the universe. And one does not understand anything unless one understands its purpose. That is, we really don’t understand what a thing does or why it does what it does unless we know its essential nature, its essential characteristics, and its telos.

That’s why Aristotle says in the very first paragraph — page 3, paragraph 1 — he says, “Every skill and every inquiry and similarly every action and rational choice is thought to aim at some good. And so the good has been aptly described as that at which everything aims. It is clear but it is clear that there some difference between ends. Some ends are activities while others are products which are additional to the activities,” and so on and so forth.

So in Aristotle’s conception there is a universe which has gigantic universal purpose and every thing and process within that universe has its own distinctive nature and its own role to play in that larger purpose. So the investigation of essences or
essential characteristics and purposes and functions is the most important task of science for Aristotle. That science is in the business of uncovering essences and functions. And, of course, you see the relationship between an essence and a function. A thing’s essential characteristics are what determine its function. So it’s because the hammer is made with a certain set of distinctive intentions and has a certain set of distinctive properties. Those are its essential characteristics. Those determine its function. So for Aristotle because the understanding of telos, the understanding of function, is that the center of understanding the nature of things and their behavior, the investigation of essential characteristics and purposes, is the most important task of science.

Now, the Greek word for the excellence that is distinctive of human beings is *eudymonia*. That word translates literally as human flourishing or human well-being. So it is simply a name tag for that which constitutes the human good, that which is the fulfillment of the distinctively human function. Remember, everything in nature has a distinctive function and this applies even to whole species. Aristotle thinks that the human race as a species has a distinctive function within the larger function of the universe.

So the word for this distinctive good, human good, is *eudymonia*. Now, it is commonly translated as happiness. So you’ll notice in your own readings that when Aristotle talks about the chief good, about the human good, it is defined as happiness. This, alas, is an unfortunate translation but it appears in most translations. There are very few which sort of stick to the letter of the word, and that’s simply for purposes of
readability. The problem, of course, is that the word happiness has a modern connotation. When we use the word happy, we mean to denote a pleasant feeling or state of mind. When I say I’m happy, what I’m basically saying is I feel good. Now, the problem is that this modern sense of happiness is utterly not what Aristotle means when he talks about the human good. When Aristotle talks about the ends of all human activity, about what constitutes human flourishing, he is not saying that what constitutes human flourishing is a life of feeling good.

And so I find the word happiness to be an unfortunate translation for eudymonia. Nonetheless, it is the translation that we find in most translations of the ethics, and so we just have to remind ourselves that in Aristotle the word happiness is what we would consider a technical term or that has a formal definition. Happiness for Aristotle is simply the human good. It is the translation for eudymonia. Of course, we don’t know yet what he thinks that is, what he thinks human flourishing consists of, but we’ll get to that very shortly. We get a clue, incidentally, when Aristotle tells us the science — Aristotle identifies the science in which the study of the human good occurs.

You know, today when we talk about human beings, human nature, human behavior, we inevitably turn to scientists to explain things to us. We turn to biologists, we turn to psychologists, we turn to neurophysiologists. Interesting, then, to see what Aristotle thinks is the primary subject area devoted to the study of human nature. Aristotle says that the science in which we study human nature and the human function and the human good is politics. Doesn’t say biology. It’s not psychology. It’s politics. Politics is the science in which we study human nature, the human function, and the
human good.

And this alone tells us volumes. For one thing, it shows us that unlike today Aristotle does not have a reductive mindset. Today, even though we acknowledge that human beings occupy and operate within a social and within a civil sphere, we today generally tend towards reductive explanations. So we want to reduce our explanations to their basic components which is why we tend to turn to hard sciences when we want to explain any phenomena.

So, sure, human beings engage in civic life and in social life, but isn’t that simply a manifestation of psychology, and isn’t psychology simply a manifestation of their neurochemistry? And so if we really went on to study human nature, we should do neurochemistry. That’s sort of the modern way of thinking. That is the classic modern reductive mindset.

Aristotle didn’t think this way at all. And the fact that he thinks that politics is the chief science area through which we study the human good tells us that. Aristotle believes it’s not at the biological but at the social and civic levels of life where human nature is most fully revealed. That is, we behave — we function in the most human way, we most fulfill our human nature, at the social and civic levels of life. Indeed, Aristotle is gonna say biology tells us — biology doesn’t tell us anything distinctive to human nature. Everything at the end of the day is made — everything on the earth at the end of the day that’s alive is made out of carbon.

So what good is studying carbon going to do to tell us anything distinctive about human nature? Everything ultimately is made of molecules. What’s distinctive about
human beings, Aristotle thinks, is sort of the social and civic forms of life in which we engage, and it's there at that level that human nature and the human good is most fully revealed. This is why politics for Aristotle is the science in which human nature and the human good are most completely understood.

Okay. So we know so far that there's human good. There's a form of excellence or fulfillment that represents the end of all human activity. The question now is what is that good? What does that good consist of? Simply to say that it's eudymonia without saying what eudymonia is, what the substance of eudymonia is, is an empty exercise. And we can't know what eudymonia is unless we first know what a human being's essential characteristics and functions are. So eudymonia is simply the name for whatever it is constitutes human fulfillment but we don't know what that is yet. In order to know what that is, in order to know what constitutes human fulfillment, we need to know what the human function is. In order to know what the human function is, we need to know what defines human nature, what are the defining characteristics of a human being.

That human beings do have essential characteristics and functions Aristotle takes for granted: a) as I've already mentioned, his entire cosmology is predicated on the notion that the universe is imbued with purpose. But secondly, Aristotle makes sort of the following observation. He says, look, all the parts of a human being have distinctive functions. So all your body parts — your organs, your musculature, your skeleton, your nervous system — all have distinctive functions. So the parts of a human being have distinctive functions. And furthermore, he says, the positions,
professions, activities that human beings occupy and engage in have distinctive functions. There’s a distinctive function to being a cabinet maker, to being a baseball pitcher, and so on and so forth. Aristotle says wouldn’t it be odd if the parts of a human being all have functions, the roles that a human being fulfills have functions, but that the human being itself has no function? He says that would be odd and would not be what one would expect.

I’m not saying that this is necessarily an argument for there being a human function and Aristotle doesn’t really require an argument for there being a human function. His cosmology entails it. But he does make those observations. Look on page 11, towards the bottom. First he says, “Perhaps saying that happiness is the chief good sounds rather platitudinous and one might want its nature to be specified still more clearly. It is possible that we might achieve that if we grasp the characteristic activity of a human being.” So this is the part where he says, look, it’s not enough to just sort of say that human good is eudymonia unless we say what eudymonia is. And then he quickly acknowledges that in order to do that we have to say what is the distinctive activity or function of a human being.

He goes on to say, “For just as the good of a flute player, a sculptor, or any practitioner of a skill, or generally whatever, has some characteristic activity or action, is thought to lie in its characteristic activity, so the same would seem to be true of a human being if indeed he has a characteristic activity. Well, do the carpenter and the tanner have characteristic activities and actions and the human being none? Has nature left him without a characteristic activity to perform? Or, as there seem to be characteristic
activities of the eye, the hand, the foot, and of each part of the body, should one assume that a human being has some characteristic activity over and above all else?”

All right. So here he’s saying look. Yes, my cosmology entails that everything in the universe has a function. But forgetting about that, wouldn’t it be awfully odd if, on the one hand, all the parts of a human being have functions and, on the other hand, all the roles that a human being can occupy have functions, but that the human being himself or herself has no function?

He then goes on to try and figure out what the human function is, the human purpose. His method of identifying this — and remember. In order to identify something’s purpose we have to identify its defining characteristics. All right. Before I can know what a hammer is for, I have to know what a hammer is. Indeed, there’s kind of a dog chasing his tail here. In order to know what something is, I need to know what is its function; in order to know its function, I need to know what it is. And the way that we come to know either one is through a process of a kind of bootstrapping.

Aristotle’s way of identifying the distinguishing characteristics of a thing or a process or of an activity is through what I’m just gonna call the method of differentiation. What Aristotle will do is compare one class of things with another in order to know those characteristics that the one class has in common with the other and know to differentiate it from the other.

For Aristotle those characteristics which differentiate one class of things from every other class of things — in other words, those characteristics which only — all and only the members of this class have, those are the defining characteristics of the class.
Obviously, he’s not gonna want to say that characteristics that we have in common with other classes or defining characteristics because, of course, those won’t differentiate us. So human beings and cows are both warm-blooded. So being warm-blooded is not going to be the characteristic that defines a human being because that will fail to distinguish human beings from cows. A defining characteristic is a distinguishing characteristic.

So the way that Aristotle is gonna go about identifying the defining characteristics of a human being and thus the human purpose and ultimately the human good is by comparing human beings to other things, to other animals and to plants. In other words, to compare human beings to the rest of life and to see what characteristics differentiate human beings from everything else. So he’s going to go through a list of characteristics of live things and see which of these characteristics distinguishes human beings from every other living thing. Those are gonna be the defining human characteristics and those are going to determine the human function and the human good.

Now, of course, the most basic characteristic that all living things have is that they’re alive. Aren’t you glad you went to college to learn that? The obvious and most basic characteristic of all living things is life, the characteristic of being alive. And, as Aristotle rightly points out, being alive or having life cannot be the defining characteristic of a human being because this will not distinguish a human being even from a blade of grass.

I mean, this isn’t — as obvious as it seems, it’s a very profound point. Because
essences, defining characteristics, are determinative of functions and purposes and thus of conceptions of fulfillment, of the good, what Aristotle is saying is, look. Simply being alive can't be what constitutes a good human life. Because simply being alive is what every shrub does, what every plant does, what every blade of grass does. Let's say at the end of your days all you'd done was be alive, haven't done anything else, just eat, breathe, go to the bathroom, and so on, you wouldn't want to say that that's a good human life. Because that's not a life that's in any way distinct even from the most basic life form, like an amoeba.

When Aristotle says that, quote — he says, at the bottom of page 11 — he's talking about what are the distinctive characteristics of a human being and says, “What sort of thing might it be? Living is obviously shared even by plants while what we are looking for is something special to a human being. We should therefore rule out the life of nourishment and growth.” What he's saying is the life of mere nourishment and growth is not the good life for a human being. It's not what human flourishing consists of because this is what every creature and plant does.

And so Aristotle would want to actually criticize a person who'd done nothing in their life other than eat, sleep, and sort of, you know, respiate. Aristotle would want to say you wasted your distinctively human characteristics. You did nothing more than a blade of grass would do.

The next characteristic that he takes into account is sentience, by which is meant sort of the cluster of sense perception and sensation or feeling. This is something that all animals do or any animal with a basic sensory apparatus and nervous system. So
once again, the life of sentience, the property of being sentient, is not going to be a defining human characteristic because it’s not anything that will distinguish a human being from a cow, a dog, a mouse. And thus the sentient life, the life of mere sensory experience and sensation, is not going to be the human good, is not going to constitute the human good.

Now, this is perhaps a bit more of a challenge, bit more of a rebuke. Nobody really thinks that simply living, eating, drinking, sleeping — you know, living and respirating — no one really thinks that that is the good life and so it’s not much of a rebuke to deny that that’s the good life. But I think an awful lot of people think that the life of mere sense experience is just fine. I mean, is it not the case — I mean, would you not suspect or agree that there are any number of people who live entirely for sensory pleasure? I don’t necessarily mean that in any sort of morally corrupt sort of sense. But just, you know, people who live to enjoy themselves.

What Aristotle wants to say is you’re not doing anything different from what a cow does or a dog. You’re not exercising — in doing that you’re not exercising any distinctively human characteristics. So even if your life is good, it’s not a good human life. The life of mere sensation might be a good mammal life or a good animal life. It’s not a good human life because it’s not distinctively a human life. There’s nothing distinctively human about it.

Now, finally the last thing that Aristotle comes to is, is activity under the jurisdiction of reason or activity in accordance with reason. And by activity I mean both mental and physical activity. So both thought and what we call action. Aristotle says
here indeed we find the distinctively human characteristic. The capacity to think and act under the guidance of reason. That is what is unique, that is what is distinctive to human beings.

So on page 12 — he’s just gone through comparing people to plants. Now he’s gone through comparing people to animals. He says, “Next would be some sort of sentient life but this again is clearly shared by the horse, the ox, indeed by every animal. What remains is a life concerned in some way with action of the element that possesses reason.”

And here and finally we discover the distinctively human characteristics. The capacity to think and to act under the guidance of reason. And so now thinking in the way that Aristotle does, if what distinguishes human beings — if the defining characteristic of a human being is the ability to act and think under the guidance of reason, then the human function, the human purpose, is to think and act under the guidance of reason. And the excellent human life will be a life in which one has thought and acted under the guidance of reason.

And for Aristotle, the life of rational behavior and thought is the good life. That is the human good. We’re inching our way forward. We know more than we started. We now know what the human good is. But, of course, what we know is still very shallow. That is, we haven’t gotten that much depth. We know now that the human good consists of a life of rational behavior and thought because that is the purpose that attaches to what is distinctive about human beings, the capacity to think and to act rationally.
But we still don’t know yet what counts as rational behavior and thought. We don’t know exactly how Aristotle means the word rational. And, as we shall find out, his conception of reason has more than one facet. That is, there’s more than one type of reasoning of which human beings are capable and the different types of reasoning attached different kinds of activity to different forms of life. We don’t know what Aristotle means by rational and we don’t know, therefore, what constitutes rational behavior and thought yet. We just know that whatever constitutes rational behavior and thought, it is the life of rational behavior and rational thinking that is the good for a human being.

This is to give you a little teaser. The life of rational behavior and thought is going to have two, in a sense, manifestations. One is a life of moral and civic virtue and the other is going to be a life spent in the pursuit of knowledge. These two forms of life correspond to two different senses of rationality, both of which Aristotle thinks define human nature.

Okay. Next time we’re going to go into more detail about what I’m gonna call the anatomy of the human soul, Aristotle’s picture of the human sort of template, human character, and these different conceptions of rationality, and where in the human soul they rest and what it is that they do in a human being’s life. Next time we’re gonna give sort of an Aristotelian analysis of the human soul as well as an analysis of moral and civic virtue.

But there’s two things I want you to think about as you’re reading on. The first is do you think of the virtuous person as one who doesn’t have any bad desires or one
who has bad desires but successfully resists them? Do you think of the virtuous
person, the good person, as one who doesn’t have bad desires or is it someone who
does have bad desires but is able to resist or otherwise sublimate those bad desires?
That’s the first question.

The second thing I want you to think about is Aristotle is going to talk about virtue
in terms of moderation. For Aristotle, the good person in the morally virtuous sense is
one who is a moderate in his temperament and behavior. What I want to ask you is —
and this is asking you to make sort of a sociological observation. Reflect on your
culture and the culture around you. Do we today generally think of virtue in terms of
moderation as Aristotle does or do we think of virtue in terms of extremes? The good
person who never does this or who always does that. So do we today generally think
of virtue in terms of moderation as Aristotle does or do we today think of virtue in terms
of extremes? And I want you to come up with some examples. These are ways of
working with the concepts that Aristotle is gonna introduce to us and the ways of think
that Aristotle is gonna introduce to us.

So until next time, keep reading and think about those question. We’ll pick this
up where we left off. Thank you very much.